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Abstract
Background: Medical personnel in hospitals often works under great physical and mental strain. In medical decision-
making, errors can never be completely ruled out. Several studies have shown that between 50 and 60% of adverse
events could have been avoided through better organization, more attention or more effective security procedures.
Critical situations especially arise during interdisciplinary collaboration and the use of complex medical technology, for
example during surgical interventions and in perioperative settings (the period of time before, during and after surgical
intervention).
Methods: In this paper, we present an ontology and an ontology-based software system, which can identify risks across
medical processes and supports the avoidance of errors in particular in the perioperative setting. We developed a practicable
definition of the risk notion, which is easily understandable by the medical staff and is usable for the software tools. Based on
this definition, we developed a Risk Identification Ontology (RIO) and used it for the specification and the identification of
perioperative risks.
Results: An agent system was developed, which gathers risk-relevant data during the whole perioperative treatment process
from various sources and provides it for risk identification and analysis in a centralized fashion. The results of such an analysis
are provided to the medical personnel in form of context-sensitive hints and alerts. For the identification of the ontologically
specified risks, we developed an ontology-based software module, called Ontology-based Risk Detector (OntoRiDe).
Conclusions: About 20 risks relating to cochlear implantation (CI) have already been implemented. Comprehensive testing
has indicated the correctness of the data acquisition, risk identification and analysis components, as well as the web-based
visualization of results.
Keywords: Perioperative risks, Ontology, Risk definition, Risk specification, Risk identification, Risk analysis, Agent system
Background
Patient safety is a quality objective and an important
factor of the quality of treatment in hospitals in general
[1]. Prevention of medical errors and risks is a significant
method to improve patient safety. Medical personnel
often work under great physical and mental strain. In
medical decision-making, errors can never be completely
ruled out [2]. In 2000, the report “To Err is Human” [3]
was published by the Institute of Medicine of the US
National Academy of Sciences (IOM). This attracted
great international attention and moved the topics of
medical risks, errors and patient safety into the focus of
the scientific interest. The IOM concluded in the report
that from 2.9 to 3.7% of all patients admitted to hospitals
in the USA sustain an adverse event. In 70% of these
cases, the patient retains no or only minor damage, 7%
lead to permanent damage and 14% cause the patient’s
death. The study also showed that between 50 and 60%
of these adverse events could have been avoided through
better organization, more attention or more effective
security procedures. Analyses show that the number of
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medical errors in Germany is also not negligible. Accord-
ing to a report by the Robert Koch Institute [4], the inci-
dence of suspected medical errors is approximately 40,000
cases across the country per year. Hence, the estimated
error recognition rate of 30% corresponds to the rate of
approximately 12,000 recognized medical errors per year.
Since the publication of “To Err Is Human”, risk
management and patient safety has consistently remained
a topic of interest for scientific studies as well as for sug-
gestions of goals for improvements [5]. Critical situations
arise especially during interdisciplinary collaboration and
the use of complex medical technology, for example
during surgical interventions and in perioperative settings.
Especially the oversight of medically relevant treatment
data or an incomplete medical history may lead to incor-
rect treatment [6].
We present an ontology and a conception for an
ontology-based software tool, which can identify and
analyze risks across medical processes. Furthermore, the
tool supports the avoidance of errors in the perioperative
setting. The results of the risk analysis are conveyed to
medical personnel in form of context sensitive hints and
alerts. The software architecture is designed to respond
not only to risks within a single treatment step, but to
also consider the patient’s entire stay in the hospital. For
a practical implementation in the clinical environment,
the cochlear implantation (CI) was selected as a surgical
use case at Jena University Hospital. For this purpose,
medical and technical treatment risks were analyzed and
medical guidelines and standards were taken into ac-
count. In addition, data and information sources were
defined based on an anonymized CI patient record.
Further sources of critical events were collected by
undertaking of qualitative interviews with technical,
nursing and medical personnel participating in a CI
treatment process. On this basis, risk situations were
defined and integrated into ontological models. This work
is a part of the OntoMedRisk project [7] funded by the
German Federal Ministry of Education and Research.
Methods
Introduction in General Formal Ontology (GFO)
The development of the intended ontologies and of the
needed ontological analyses are carried out within the
top-level ontology GFO [8, 9]. In GFO, the entities of
the world are classified into categories and individuals.
Categories can be instantiated, but individuals are not
instantiable. GFO allows for categories of higher order,
i.e. there are categories whose instances are themselves
categories, for example the category “species”. Spatio-
temporal individuals are classified along two axes, the
first one explicates the individual’s relation to time and
space, and the second one describes the individual’s
degree of existential independence.
Spatio-temporal individuals are classified into continu-
ants, presentials and processes. Continuants persist
through time and have a lifetime. A particular kind of con-
tinuant corresponds to ordinary objects such as cars, balls,
trees, etc. These are called material objects: they carry a
unity, consist of matter and occupy space. The lifetime of
a continuant is presented by a time interval of non-zero
duration; such time intervals are called chronoids in GFO
[10]. Continuants are individuals, which may change, for
example, an individual cat C crossing the street. Then, at
every point in time t of crossing, C exhibits a snapshot
C(t). These snapshots differ in their properties. Further,
the cat C may lose parts while crossing, though, remaining
the same entity. The entities C(t) are individuals of their
own, called presentials; they are wholly present at a
particular point in time, being a time boundary. If the
continuant is a material object M, the presentials exhibited
by M at point in time t, denoted by M(t), are called mater-
ial structures. Presentials cannot change, because any
change needs an extended time interval or two coinciding
time boundaries.
Processes are temporally extended entities that happen
in time, for example a run; they can never be wholly
present at a point in time. Processes have temporal
parts, being themselves processes. If a process P is
temporally restricted to a point in time then it yields a
presential M, which is called a process boundary of P
[10]. Hence, presentials have two different origins, they
may be snapshots of continuants or parts of process
boundaries [9]. There is a duality between processes and
presentials, the latter are wholly present at a point in
time, whereas this is never true for processes. The corre-
sponding classes/sets of individuals, denoted by the
predicates Cont(x), Pres(x), and Proc(x), are assumed to
be pair-wise disjoint. Processes are the most basic kind
of entity, because they form a ground for presentials and
continuants, and determine the coherence of spatiotem-
poral reality. A boundary of a process P is defined by the
restriction of this process to a point in time of its
temporal extension. We postulate that any presential is a
part of some process boundary.
The integration between material objects and pro-
cesses is proposed in the integration law in GFO, which
states that for every material object M, being a continu-
ant, there is a process Proc(M), the boundaries of which
coincide with the presentials exhibited by M. There are
several basic relations which canonically connect
processes, presentials, and continuants [8, 9].
Spatio-temporal individuals, according to the second
axis, are classified with respect to their complexity and
their degree of existential independency. Attributives
depend on bearers, which can be continuants, presen-
tials, and processes. Situations are parts of reality, which
can be comprehended as a coherent whole [11]. Material
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situations are composed of material objects, which are
connected by relators, and relators are instances of rela-
tions. Situoids are processes, which satisfy principles of
coherence, comprehensibility, and continuity. A surgical
intervention is an example of a process or a situoid. A
snapshot of this situoid at a certain point in time is a
surgical presentic situation, which has a spatial location
and includes various entities such that a coherent whole
is established.
There is a variety of types of attributives, among them,
qualities, roles, functions, dispositions, and structural
features. Properties are categories, the instances of which
are attributives. According to the different types of
attributives (relational roles, qualities, structural features,
individual functions, dispositions, factual, etc.) we distin-
guish quality properties and role properties, and the role
properties are classified into relational role properties
(abr. relational properties) as well as social role proper-
ties (social properties).
Ontological definition of the risk notion
The solution of all philosophical problems related to the
notion of risk is out of the scope of this paper. Instead,
we focus on a practicable definition of the risk notion,
which can be easily understood by medical staff and is
usable for the software tools. Our definition of the risk
notion has been developed in close cooperation with do-
main experts (medical staff ). Based on this definition, it
should be possible for the medical staff to specify the
relevant risk types, and for the software to identify and
to analyze the risk in a particular treatment situation.
There are various definitions of the notion of risk.
One of the most known/popular definitions is presented
in [12]. The authors divide the notion of risk into three
components, which are associated to the following
questions:
1. What can happen, i.e., what can go wrong?
(scenario)
2. How likely is it that that will happen? (probability of
the scenario)
3. If it does happen, what are the consequences?
(consequence of the scenario)
A risk, then, is a triple which consists of a scenario,
the probability of that scenario, and consequence of that
scenario.
Furthermore, there are several standards investigating
the notion of risk. The ISO/IEC 27005:2008 [13] defines
the notion of risk (information security risk) as “poten-
tial that a given treat will exploit vulnerabilities of an
asset or group of assets and thereby cause harm to the
organization”; the OHSAS 18001:2007 [14] - as a “com-
bination of the likelihood of an occurrence of a
hazardous event or exposure(s) and the severity of injury
or ill health that can be caused by the event or expo-
sure(s)”; and the ISO 31000 (Risk management) [15] - as
an “effect of uncertainty on objectives”.
In [16] the authors analyze 11 common definitions of
risk and characterize them based on three categories: (a)
risk as a concept based on events, consequences and un-
certainties; (b) risk as a modeled, quantitative concept
(reflecting the aleatory uncertainties); and (c) subjective
risk descriptions. Most definitions belong to category (a),
the rest can be interpreted both in the sense of (b) or (c).
The common ground of most risk definitions is that
all of them consider a risk as involving a possibility for
the occurrence of a particular event or situation. Most of
these definitions consider such events as adverse ones.
The ontological analysis of risk is carried out within
the framework of GFO and takes into account the avail-
able definitions of risk. The analysis is built upon the
ontology of situations and situation types, which partly
uses ideas presented in [11, 17]. Adverse situations are
situations that contain adverse events. In this paper we
use the notion of adverse event/situation not only in the
sense of “Any untoward occurrence that may present
during treatment with a pharmaceutical product but
which does not necessarily have a causal relation to the
treatment” [18], but we also include events/situations
that are not related to medical interventions.
The notion of a possible situation is established within
the framework of a particular actualist representationism,
which postulates that possible situations are abstract en-
tities, the existence of which is consistent with the currently
available knowledge about the actual world. This view is
partly influenced by [19–21] and is subsequently explicated
for material situations. Material situations are composed of
material facts, which are constituted by material objects and
connecting relators. An example of a material fact is a
spatio-temporal entity that is denoted by the expression
“John’s drinking a beer”. Associated to this fact we may con-
struct the relational proposition “John is drinking a beer”.
There is a difference between a fact and the corresponding
proposition. A proposition is an abstract entity, which can
be satisfied by facts (which are parts of reality). Arbitrary ab-
stract situations are sets of relational propositions, which
are not necessarily abstracted from real, i.e. actual situations.
An abstract situation S is realized by an actual situation S′ if
any relational proposition in S is satisfied in the situation S′.
An abstract situation S, related to a domain D, is said to be
possible if it is consistent with the currently available know-
ledge about D, the domain experts agreed on. Hence, a pos-
sible situation has the potential to be realized by an actual
situation. A (spatiotemporal) situation S is said to be a risk
situation if it satisfies certain conditions, which imply that
for one of its possible succeeding situations S′ any of its
realizing situations is an adverse situation.
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We hold that a risk exists in a situation, that it de-
pends on it, and, hence, that it can be considered as a
situation’s property. We distinguish between single (in
sense of gfo:Property [8]) and composite properties, the
latter being composed of single ones and which can be
disassembled by the relation gfo:has_part.
Definition 1. A composite property CP is a property
that has as parts several single properties SP1, ..., SPn.
Definition 2. A risk for an adverse situation of type
AST is a composite property CP such that every
situation S possessing the property CP has a possible
succeeding situation of type AST, which can be realized
with a certain probability.
Definition 3. A risk is a composite property CP for
which there exists an adverse situation AST such that CP
is a risk for the adverse situation AST (as defined by 2).
Definition 4. A risk situation is a situation having at
least one risk (Fig. 1). In this paper, we consider risk sit-
uations as situations with a risk recognized as relevant
by the medical community and non-risk situations as
situations with no risk recognized as relevant by the
medical community.
Example 1. The risk of a bacterial infection during
cochlear implantation in infants depends on various
parameters, such as the infants’ age, the corresponding
bone thickness of the skull and the inner ear structure.
If the child is younger than 5 months, the bone thick-
ness mostly remains below 2 mm. Thus, the risk of
penetrating the skull and injuring the dura mater during
surgery increases so that the risk of the bacterial dura
mater infection (meningitis) increases as well. The
ground-truth probability for the adverse event of dura
mater infection during CI is about 5–9% [22]. For men-
ingitis prevention, the patient has to be vaccinated
against pneumococcus, meningococcus and haemophilus
influenzae type b several weeks before the surgery (indi-
cation phase). In addition, an antibiotic prevention
should be performed right before the surgery. According
to our definition an increased risk for acquiring menin-
gitis can be represented as a composite property,
consisting of three single properties, namely, the young
age (< 5 month), the absence of a meningitis vaccination,
as well as the absence of an antibiotic prevention. This
example is used in this paper for further explanations.
Results
Risk Identification Ontology (RIO)
We developed a Risk Identification Ontology (RIO,
Fig. 2), which is built upon the ontological model of the
notion of risk. This ontology is used for the specification
and the identification of perioperative risks. The ontol-
ogy RIO is founded in the GFO. As the starting point we
consider the treatment process, which may consist of
various treatment phases (gfo:has_part). The complete
treatment as well as the phases are complex processes
(gfo:Situoid). The treatment has a particular temporal
extension, called the treatment time (gfo:Chronoid).
According to GFO processes are projected (gfo:project-
s_to) onto their time intervals. For every point in time
(gfo:Time_boundary) of the treatment exists (gfo:exist-
s_at) exactly one treatment situation (gfo:Situation). A
point in time of the treatment is according to GFO a
boundary of the treatment time (gfo:boundary_of),
whereas the corresponding treatment situation is a
boundary of the treatment itself.
For each treatment phase, particular points in time of
risk detection (PTRD) can be defined. The treatment sit-
uations, existing at these points in time, are analyzed
with respect to the existence of risks. Such situations are
called potential risk situations (PRS), because they do
Fig. 1 Definition of the risk notion (the white arrows represent the is-a relation)
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not necessarily contain risks. Situations and in particular
treatment situations possess various properties (gfo:-
Property). These properties may belong to the situation,
but also to the participants, as, for example physicians
(doctors), medical instruments, and, most important, to
the patients. We consider these properties also as
properties of the current treatment situation (gfo:ha-
s_property). Properties of the potential risk situations
that are relevant for the estimation of the risk are called
KPIs (Key Performance Indicators) in this paper. Ac-
cording to Definitions 1–4 a particular combination of a
subset of the KPIs of a PRS (for example, age of
patient = 3 months, menginitis vaccination = false) is a
risk if the PRS may lead to an adverse situation at a later
point in time (rio:succeeding_situation).
A PRS may contain various risks, and risks of the same
type (the instances of the same risk class) may occur in
distinct PRS and may lead (rio:risk_for_adverse_situa-
tion) to distinct adverse situations (the instances of the
same adverse situation class). Each KPI is associated
with potential risk situations, whereas the risk situations
additionally possess the composite risk properties.
Furthermore, the risks can be related to those treatment
phases for which they are relevant (rio:risk_in_phase). A
risk is relevant in a particular phase, if all required KPI
values for the risk assessment need to be recorded (e.g.
according to external or internal hospital guidelines) and
need to be available in this phase in a respective
database to prevent the risk from being realized in an
adverse situation. Adverse situations may exhibit various
degrees of severity and risks may possess various prob-
abilities for the occurrence of adverse situations.
With help of the RIO the risks in a current potential
risk situation are identified by the software component
Fig. 2 Risk Identification Ontology (RIO)
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OntoRiDe, and, hence the situation can be classified
either as a risk or as a non-risk situation.
Risk specification
Perioperative risk assessment
For the development of a perioperative risk identification
ontology the recognition and assessment of potential
medical, technical, organizational, and human risk
factors are an essential prerequisite. Therefore, an exten-
sive risk assessment was performed for an otorhinolar-
yngological use case. The insertion of cochlear implants
(CI) was chosen in order to demonstrate the features
and benefits of the ontology-based risk identification
system. The perioperative medical and technical risk
factors, procedure related complications and their com-
plication rates as well as prevention strategies were
extracted from peer-reviewed publications and evidence-
based best-practice guidelines of the German Society of
Oto-Rhino-Laryngology, Head and Neck Surgery [23]. In
addition, entries of the Critical Incident Reporting System
(CIRS) of the University Hospital Jena (Germany) and an
example of an anonymized patient record were analyzed
for organization and human-related risk assessment. The
derived risk characteristics, potential following adverse sit-
uations and their causes were used to describe relevant
perioperative and cross-process risks factors.
Perioperative process modeling
The information of risk factors and of potentially adverse
events has to be provided to the responsible medical
personnel at the right time by offering appropriate
context-sensitive hints and alerts. Therefore, the medical
and organizational processes have to be taken into ac-
count. The general perioperative workflow of the CI treat-
ment was modeled and visualized in a process diagram, as
event-driven process chain (EPC). In the following, both
generalized and use-case specific treatment phases were
defined in the formal process model. The generalized
treatment phases are depicted in Fig. 3. Besides the CI
treatment process, the defined phases are suitable for
representing various elective surgeries and interventions.
The treatment process was modeled by representing
the sequence of clinical activities, treatment decisions,
parallel processes and possible events, the involved per-
sons as well as resources, like data and documents, med-
ical devices, or IT systems. In addition, the identified
risk factors, complications, and prevention activities
were integrated in the process model.
By mapping the identified risk factors to the dedicated
activities and treatment phases, the process model was
then used subsequently for further risk assessment and
perioperative risk modeling. This enabled over 120 po-
tential perioperative risks to be identified and also
mapped to their related process step in the process
model.
Perioperative risks modeling
In the next step the identified potential risk factors, ad-
verse situations, and critical incidents, which are related
to cochlear implantation interventions, were examined
in an extensive risk analysis. Thereof, a risk classification
for formal risk specification was derived. The identified
risk factors were subsequently classified into different
categories of medical, organizational, technical, or
human-related risks. Thus, the treatment phases were
categorized into risk detection phases, in which the
corresponding risk is relevant and could potentially lead
to an adverse situation. Additionally, there is a category
for cross-process risks, which could lead anytime to an
adverse situation, e.g. the risk of dizziness and falls or
the high bleeding risk during surgery due to anticoagu-
lant medication.
For each treatment phase, different KPIs were defined,
which allow the identification of specific perioperative
risks. The KPIs are linked with operators and a certain
data range to a conditional expression of a possible risk
factor (e.g., c1: Age_in_months IN [0, 5), c4: Vaccina-
tion_status == “no”, Fig. 4, Example 1). The KPI data
type values could be for instance a Boolean value, text,
date, or number. A combination of these conditional ex-
pressions is formalized as a risk specification rule. If the
risk specification rule becomes true, due to the values of
their conditions and KPIs, there is a high occurrence
probability of adverse situations, which have to be also
specified for each risk. In addition, for each adverse situ-
ation an occurrence probability and a severity were de-
fined (the severity is defined on a separate spreadsheet).
In the risk specification, the KPIs were described along
with their possible acquisition sources. Therefore, the risk
specification defines both the required measurement
phases and the measurement sources, like patient-related
Fig. 3 Treatment phases
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data and sensor data, e.g. data from the digital patient rec-
ord, the hospital information system, checklists, or situa-
tions in actual process execution. In Fig. 4 a risk
specification based on Example 1 is presented.
The tool RIOGen, developed within the project, gener-
ates ontological entities from the risk specification and
inserts them into RIO. For every risk condition, for
example, a subclass of the corresponding KPI is inserted.
Here the class names are automatically generated
according to certain rules. For every condition class an
anonymous equivalent class is created as property re-
striction, based on the property has_data_value (Fig. 5).
Then, for each risk a subclass of rio:Risk is created. The
name for the subclass is defined in the risk specification
(e.g., Risk Name: Infection_Risk_001, Fig. 4). For the risk
subclass, an equivalent anonymous class is also defined
which is based on the has_part property and on the cor-
responding condition classes; this anonymous class rep-
resents the risk specification rule (Fig. 6). Furthermore,
the treatment phases are created and connected with
those KPIs and risks which are relevant for them. Fi-
nally, we define the connections between risks and those
adverse situations, which possibly evolve from them, as
annotations (incl. probability and severity, Fig. 7). We
specified the probability as annotation (as_probability) of
the annotation relating to the adverse situation
(risk_for_adverse_situation).
Ontology-based Risk Detector (OntoRiDe)
We developed an ontology-based software module,
called Ontology-based Risk Detector (OntoRiDe), which
allows the identification of the ontologically specified
risks. This tool receives the KPIs of the current potential
risk situation as an input parameter, and carries out the
risk specification rule, which is contained in the ontol-
ogy; then it classifies the current situation as a risk or
non-risk situation and returns the results. If the current
KPIs satisfy one of the rules (i.e., at least one risk is rec-
ognized) then the considered situation is a risk situation,
otherwise it is a non-risk situation.
Further information, which the tool returns to the
user, includes the description of the existing risks, the
treatment phases, in which the risks are relevant, but
also the adverse situations, which may evolve from them
(with the probability of occurrence and degree of sever-
ity). The most important functionality is the possibility
to recognize the risks, but, furthermore, to determine
and provide for every recognized risk all combinations
of current KPIs that are responsible for every recognized
risk. Using this information the user is able to eliminate
all of the risks‘causes.
In the following, we briefly sketch the functionalities of
the OntoRiDe. For every risk class the corresponding risk
specification rule, which is specified as an anonymous
equivalent class (Fig. 6), is interpreted and transformed
Fig. 4 Risk specification
Fig. 5 Risk conditions
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into a disjunctive normal form (by stepwise execution of
the de Morgan rules and of the law of distributivity). Any
of the conjunctions presents a possible explanation for the
risk (e.g., “c1 AND c4 AND c6” and “c3 AND c5 AND
c6”, Fig. 4). Then, the single conditions (Fig. 5) are
checked, i.e., it is determined whether the current KPI
value is included in the specified value range. If all condi-
tions of the conjunction are satisfied, then the correspond-
ing KPIs and further information are provided for the user
as explanation.
We did not use a standard DL reasoner. Instead, we
implemented suitable functions in OntoRiDe, which are
relevant for the specific risk identification problem.
Firstly, we want to apply rules, which cannot be easily
interpreted by standard reasoners, especially rules which
contain mathematical expressions or predefined con-
stants. Such special types of rules are implemented by
the OntoRiDe. Secondly, standard reasoners carry out
various tasks, such as checking the consistency, classifi-
cation, and realization. However, most of these standard
tasks are not relevant for the identification of risks. This
leads to a reduced efficiency of the overall system, if a
standard reasoner is utilized for the interpretation of risk
specification rules. Finally, OntoRiDe must provide the
user with all possible explanations about the existence of
a risk in the current situation in an understandable way.
The problem of detection and exploration of all possible
explanations or justifications of an entailment is a well--
known task, for the solution of which there exists several
methods and tools [24–26]. Furthermore, there are vari-
ous investigations about the cognitive complexity and
the understanding of the considered justifications [27,
28]. In this context a justification of an entailment is
understood to be “the minimal set of axioms sufficient to
produce an entailment” [24]. In [27, 28] the understand-
ability of justifications and the corresponding reading
strategies of OWL users are analyzed. The details of
several user studies show that ontology developers find
certain justifications very difficult to understand and to
work with. We developed a very simple form of explan-
ation, which is understandable for the medical
personnel. The OntoRiDe translates the risk specifica-
tion rules into a disjunctive normal form and checks all
conditions of the respective conjunctions. By this
procedure all KPI combinations, verified by the rule as
true, and the corresponding conditions (value ranges),
can be provided for the user in form of understandable
explanations (e.g., age < 5 month and vaccination = “no”
and antibiotic prevention = false).
In this way, we identify all and only relevant risks in
the current situation, as well as provide all possible ex-
planations for them, so that all requirements have been
fulfilled. Although the OntoRiDe is not a reasoner, it is
sound and complete with regard to our problem.
Fig. 6 Risk specification rule
Fig. 7 Annotations of risk and adverse situation
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Agent system
OntoRiDe is embedded into an agent system, which is
developed within the project OntoMedRisk. The purpose
of this system is to conveniently access data, that is dis-
tributed across various data sources within a hospital in
a unified manner. In this way, the agent system derives
elementary information for identifying risk situations.
The data has to be collected by the agent system and is
determined by a set of KPIs. They represent risk-
relevant parameters, which have to be monitored by the
agent system throughout the entire perioperative treat-
ment process. The collected KPI-related data is provided
for the risk identification and analysis in a centralized
fashion. The results of those analyses are then forwarded
to the medical staff as context-sensitive hints and alerts.
The goal of OntoMedRisk is to reduce the risks of ad-
verse situations and complications through early and ad-
equate interventions.
The functional architecture of the agent system is
shown in Fig. 8. The agent system is integrated into the
hospital information system from which it collects
patient and risk related data. Besides the data and agent
related components, the agent system also includes the
functional components OntoRiDe and OntoRA (Ontology-
based Risk Analysis). The software-based agent system has
been implemented using the Java Agent Development
Framework (JADE) [29]. JADE embodies a framework, a
platform and the middleware for a FIPA-standardized
(Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents, [30]) develop-
ment of multiagent systems. The main functions of a
JADE-based agent system can be categorized into supplying
agent behavior and agent communication. The agents
communicate in an asynchronous, message-based fashion,
using the Agent Communication Language (ACL) [30].
The internal data storage (FHIRbase) of the agent system is
based upon the HL7-FHIR specification [31]. Therefore,
Fig. 8 Architecture of the agent system
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the data within the agent system is represented as FHIR re-
sources. The agent system models, for example, the infor-
mation received from OntoRiDe as FHIR RiskAssessment
Resource and saves it in the FHIRbase for further analysis.
We have been able to map all relevant risk information to
FHIR. The input KPIs have been saved, for example, as Ris-
kAssessment.basis (indicates the source data considered as
part of the assessment (FamilyHistory, Observations, Proce-
dures, Conditions, etc.)), the possible adverse situations –
as RiskAssessment.prediction.outcome (one of the potential
outcomes for the patient (e.g. remission, death, a particular
condition)), the probability of an adverse situation – as Ris-
kAssessment.prediction.probability (how likely is the out-
come), and the explanations for a detected risk – as
RiskAssessment.prediction.rationale (additional information
explaining the basis for the prediction) [31].
The continuous patient-specific risk monitoring relates
to the treatment phases of the perioperative treatment
process. Based on the supplied phase information,
OntoRiDe provides a phase-specific KPI set to the Agent
Controller. Using this information, the Agent Controller
generates patient-specific Data Retrieval Agents, which
manage the KPI sets and periodically send requests to
the Data Access Agents. Those agents are specifically
tailored for each data source in order to fetch data cor-
rectly. The collected KPI data is sent back to the
requesting Data Retrieval Agents and stored in the
FHIRbase. Based on a trigger, the Risk Communication
Agent fetches the patient-specific KPI data from this
database and sends it to OntoRiDe for risk identification
purposes. The risk reports resulting from this identifica-
tion process are then forwarded to OntoRA for further
processing. The purpose of OntoRA is to analyze the
identified risk situations and to provide the results in a
web interface, which can be accessed by medical staff
within the hospital information system.
Therefore, OntoRA implements a responsive, web-based
user interface hosted on the Apache Tomcat platform [32],
which allows the development of a platform-independent
solution, lowering costs and increasing flexibility.
The server-sided component of the application consists
of two parts, a backend for the web content and a web ser-
vice to which the agent system can send data. The web
service stores the received data in a MongoDB database
[33] hosted within the hospital information system. If a
client requests data, the backend takes care of this request
by fetching the data from the database and sending it to
the client. The client-side uses a responsive approach,
which allows the usage of web interfaces on multiple de-
vices, such as desktop PCs, tablets, and phones. To
achieve this, a combination of HTML5 [34], JQuery [35]
and Bootstrap 3 [36] is used. The user interface consists of
two web pages, a patient overview and a page containing a
patient’s risks, which are displayed in the user’s web
browser. The user can select the patient of interest, whose
risks are to be displayed. In this view, the risks are ordered
by the severity of each risk-event combination. After
selecting a risk tile, detailed information like the risk de-
scription or risk parameters are displayed (Fig. 9).
The agent system is currently deployed at the Jena
University Hospital. Referring to Fig. 8, the hospital
information system in which the agent system is inte-
grated into is displayed in Fig. 10. The agent system has
to collect data from various data sources within the
same subnet (1) and from a FHIR server, which holds
patient-related data (2). Because of several linked sub-
nets, the agent system also has to request KPI data from
a communication server (3) in order to access data from
remote data sources in different subnets.
Related work
Several approaches towards the formal representation of
risks and adverse events through ontologies are de-
scribed in the literature. We analyzed these existing on-
tologies for their potential to detect perioperative risks
in hospitals, but we concluded that none of these ontol-
ogies and tools could be applied to our project.
Bouamrane et al. [37–39] report on the development
of an ontology-based system to support clinical decision
making. The support is provided in a two-step process.
First, the developed system calculates risk scores using
numerical formulas. In this step, the system does not
use the developed ontology but computes numeric
values using an open-source Java-based rule engine
(JBoss Rules). After calculating the relevant risk scores,
the DL reasoner (Pellet) classifies the patient into several
predefined categories for risks, recommended tests and
precaution protocols, using the OWL-DL representation
of the patient medical history profile and the decision
support ontology. The decision support ontology is di-
vided into three domains: a risk assessment ontology, a
recommended test ontology and a precaution protocol
ontology. The aim of the risk assessment ontology is to
detect potential risks of intra-operative and post-
operative complications in a given formal representation
of a patient medical profile.
Similar to the system of Bouamrane, our approach also
provides two components of decision support namely
OntoRiDe and OntoRA (Fig. 8). They can perform simi-
lar tasks as those of Bouamrane’s system. In addition,
OntoRiDe will also use the self-developed RIO for risk
identification similarly to the usage of the risk assessment
ontology. However, there are also important differences
between the two ontologies and systems. The risk assess-
ment ontology focuses only on the patients’ risk related to
intra-operative and post-operative complications such as
cardio-vascular and respiratory risks, whereas RIO covers
various risk types such as special and general treatment
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risks, technical risks, organizational risks etc. The
second significant difference is that our approach in-
tegrates the treatment process, its steps, and situa-
tions in the risk conceptualization. In this way, it is
possible to analyze and identify cross process risks or
risk situations so that errors, especially in the peri-
operative field, could be avoided.
In [40] Third et al. describe a model for representing
scientific knowledge of risk factors in medicine. This
model enables the clinical experts to encode the risk
associations between biological, demographic, lifestyle
and environmental elements and clinical outcomes in
accordance with evidence from the clinical literature.
The major advantage of our approach in comparison
Fig. 10 Integration of the agent system into the hospital information system of the Jena University Hospital
Fig. 9 Visualization of risk information in the web interface of OntoRA
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with the model developed by Third is the formal repre-
sentation of cross process risks that can lead to potential
adverse situations during different treatment phases. An-
other added value of our approach is that it can also
cover risks related to human and environmental factors
such as technical or organizational risks. These types of
risks are not considered in Third’s model.
In [41] an ontology of the Open Process Task Model
(OPT-Model) is presented. This ontology is primary
intended as a generic knowledge base, which implements
the various influences of processes and their relations in
medical environments, for a prospective risk analysis.
The advantage of RIO over the OPT-model-ontology is
that it provides an accurate risk analysis. By using RIO,
OntoRiDe is able to perform risk classifications accord-
ing to the risk occurrence time. This process allows us
to identify the point in time and treatment phase on
which a risk arise. Another further benefit of RIO is the
implicitly embedded risk specification, which meets the
spirit of evidence-based medicine. This implicit domain
knowledge is encoded in OWL rules and can be inferred
automatically using ontological reasoning to assess
current perioperative risk situations.
In [42] the authors report a clinical decision support
system (CDSS) for undergoing surgery based on domain
ontology and rules reasoning in the setting of hospital-
ized diabetic patients. Similar to our approach this sys-
tem uses logical rules to complement the domain
knowledge with implicitly embedded risk specification
and clinical domain knowledge. The important upside of
our approach is that it does not make restrictions based
on certain diseases such as diabetes mellitus, whereas
CDSS focuses only on glycemic management of diabetic
patients undergoing surgery.
The Ontology of Adverse Events (OAE) [43] and the
Ontology of Vaccine Adverse Events (OVAE) [44]
(Marcos, Zhao, and He 2013), which was developed
based on OAE, describe data relating to adverse events.
The OAE was designed to standardize and integrate data
relating to adverse events that occur after medical inter-
vention. The OVAE is used for representing and analyz-
ing adverse events associated with US-licensed human
vaccines. In OAE the notion adverse event is defined as
a pathological bodily process that occurs after a medical
intervention (e.g., following a vaccination), while a risk is
represented by a factor associated with the occurrence
of an adverse event. The work presented here focuses in-
stead on the risk situations and proposes a generic
model for the risk specification in the perioperative area.
Thus, we do not restrict ourselves to risks that are caus-
ally and exclusively related to medical interventions.
Contrary to OAE, our approach also considers other risk
types such as technical and organizational risks. More-
over, we use the term “adverse situation” in order to
avoid excluding situations that are not related to medical
interventions.
We also analyzed several conversion tools such as
Excel2OWL, Mapping Master and Populus [45–47] for
their potential to build an expressive formal ontology
from our risk specification spreadsheet, but we con-
cluded that none of these tools could be applied to our
project. In fact, our Excel spreadsheet contains domain
specific logical rules (see Figs. 4 and 6) that are not cov-
ered in these software solutions. We therefore decided
to develop RIOGen, a Java tool that enables us to
automatically generate RIO entities from the risk specifi-
cation template.
Discussion
We elaborated an ontological foundation of the notion
of risk, upon which we developed a Risk Identification
Ontology (RIO). With help of RIO perioperative risks
can be specified, whereas OntoRiDe can be used to iden-
tify risks in a given treatment situation. This allows the
recognition of risk situations and supports the avoidance
of possible adverse effects or consequences. Further-
more, we implemented an agent system to realize the
ontology-based approach. This agent system gathers
during the whole perioperative treatment process risk-
relevant data from various sources and provides it for
the risk identification respectively the risk analysis in a
centralized fashion. The results of those analyses are
transmitted to the medical personnel in form of context
sensitive hints and alerts.
None of the presented approaches (s. “Related work”)
can answer competency questions such as “Which treat-
ment situation could be a potential risk situation?”,
“Which properties or KPIs are responsible for an actual
risk situation?” and “Which risk situation belongs to
which treatment phase?”. The aim of RIO and OntoRiDe
is to solve this issue.
Our approach has the following limitations: 1. Only
known und specified risks can be identified by the
system; 2. All required data (KPIs) must be available in
the respective source systems in electronic form. There-
fore, the system can only react to known and correctly
specified risks to which the required data was electronic-
ally recorded.
Future work
Further development of the agent system will encompass
the implementation of interfaces for different 3rd party
data sources in collaboration with their original vendors.
To facilitate the expansion of the agent system, a devel-
oper package for Data Access Agents will be released,
providing interfaces for integrating additional data
sources in conformance to the given specifications.
Furthermore, it is intended to expand and to optimize
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the application of the agent system to cater for
additional use cases and to better support mobile devices
in order to provide real-time feedback and improve
usability. Finally, future work could include a machine-
learning approach, where the agent system recognizes
adverse events by itself and derives risks, which subse-
quently will be monitored to prevent the repeated
occurrence of these adverse events.
The presented Risk Identification Ontology could be
used for the ontology-based analysis of clinical studies
for different medical applications and use cases. Future
work will include further analysis and clinical evaluation
studies.
Our present work raises the question of what are the
formal, ontological connections between a risk, its
adverse situation and its probability. This question will
also be examined and discussed in the future.
Conclusion
We developed the Risk Identification Ontology and an
ontology-based agent system, which can identify and
analyze risks across medical processes and supports the
avoidance of errors in the perioperative setting. About
20 risks relating to cochlear implantations have already
been implemented. Comprehensive testing has shown
that a stable and platform-independent deployment of
all components on different virtual machines was
successful. Further testing using the FHIR server as a
source for KPI data has illustrated the correctness of the
data collection, risk identification and risk analysis
components, as well as the web-based visual representa-
tion of results. The test system contains a web-based
form for entering the test data sets, which are then
stored on the FHIR server. The domain experts (medical
staff ) have tested the functionality and usability of the
system based on practice-relevant test data. According
to the interviews with domain experts, the system
currently meets all specified requirements.
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